The actions of the federal govemment can have a profound impact on financial markets. As prominent participant.'^ in the govemment decision making pr(x:ess. U.S. Senators are likely to have knowledge of forthcoming government actions before the inlormaiion becomes public. This could provide them with an informational advantage over oiher investors. We test for abnonnal retums from the common stock investments of members of the U.S. Senate during the period 1W3-I998. We document that a portfolio that mimics the purchases of U,S, Senators beats ihe market by H5 basis points per month, while a portfolio that mimics the sales of Senators lags the market by 12 basis points per month. The large difference in the returns of stocks bought and sold (nearly one percentage point per month) is economically large and reliably positive.
I. Introduction
Decisions made by the federal govertiment often have serious implications for corporate profitability and are therefore of keen interest to the financial markets. U.S. Senators are among the most important participants in that decision process by virtue of their role as lawmakers and overseers of most federal agencies. Senators may also be embedded in social networks that provide them with access to valuable infomiation. As such. Senators might be able to capitalize on this superior Information through stock trading. Yet. despite their access to special information, neither federal law nor The Senate Code of Official Conduct places any unu,sual restrictions on the Senators' common stcK-k transactions. According to the U.S. Senate Ethics Manual, "Tlie strong presumption would be that the Member wa.s working for legislation because of the public interest and the needs of his constituents and that his own financial interest was only incidentally related ... ," However, public choice theory (see Buchanan and Tollison (1984) ) suggests that ,'iuch a presumption is unrealistic. That people act to maximize their personal utility in their public capacities as well as their private lives is the most fundamental principle of public choice theory. Thus, voters can be expected to make choices that they anticipate will maximize benefits to them personally or minimize costs. Of more relevance to this study, their elected government oflicials can be expected to behave likewise. As an example, it is well d(x.'umented that as a member of Congress in the t940s and 19.S0s. Lyndon B. Johnson frequently used his political intlticnce at the Federal Communication Commission to obtain licenses for his radio and television stations and to block competition from invading his markets in Texas. Johnson's influence allowed him to ultimately grow an initial investment of $17,500 into a multi-media company worth millions. ' There is no academic literature dealing with Congressional common stock returns. The only related literature is Boiler (199?) . who investigated a random sample of Congressional delegates (both Senators iuid Members o! the U.S. House of Representatives) and found that 25% of them invested in companies that could be directly affected by ongoing legislative activity. However, this result merely suggests a potential conflict of interest. His research did not demon.strate tbat these investments yielded unusually large retums.
Our goal in this research is to determine if the Senators* investments tend to outperform the overall mtu-ket. Such a linding would support the notion that Senators use their informational advantage for persona! gain. We test whetlier the common stocks purchased and sold by U.S. Senators exhibit abnormal returns. Assuming returns are truly "incidental," we hypothesize that U.S. Senators should not eam statistically significant positive abnormal retums on their common stock acquisitions (the null). Rejection of the null. i.e.. a finding of statistically significant positive abnonnal returns, would suggest that Senators are trading stock based on information that is unavailable to the public, thereby using their unique position to increase their personal wealth.
Federal law requires all Senators to disclose their common stock transactions annually in a Financial Disclosure Report (FDR) . We use an event study methodology to measure abnormal returns for common stock acquisitions and sales reported by the Senators in their FDRs during the period 1993 through 1998. The trigger events in our study are the stock purchases and sales made by the Senators. Since the.se transactions were not publicly reported until long after tbey occurred (anywhere from five lo 17 months later), the subsequent returns of these stocks could not have been market reactions to tbe actual transactions themselves. Any statistically significant abnormal returns therefore would likely be ihe result of reactions to events anticipated by Senators and motivated tbeir transactions.
We Hnd that the behavior of common stiKks purchased and sold by Senafors indicates that Senators trade with a substantial informational advantage. Using the calendar-time portfolio approach with the Fama-French three-factor model Soe Dallok (1 Wl) imd tither biographies ol"Lyndon B. Jolinson for more details. and the Capital A.ssct Pricing Model (CAPM). a portfolio that mimics the purchases uf U.S. Senators on a trade-weighled basis tnitperfornis ihe market by 85 basis points per month, while a portfolio that mimics the sales nf Senators underperforms the market by 12 basis points per month. For Senate stock purchase transactions, the abnormal returns are both economically large iind statistically signiticant. When measuring cumulative daily abnonnal returns we tind that Ihe cimiulative daily abnormal return from common stocks purchased by Senators is more than 25% during the 12 calendar months immediately following acquisition. Common stocks sold by Senators exhibit slightly positive cumulative abnormal retums throughout the year following the sale. But during the 12 months prior to sale, the cumulative daily abnormal return is also over 25%, peaking close to the time ot sale.
We also analyze the data for several subsampies to examine the sensitivity of the restilts to the Senators' piuly affiliation and seniority. When transactions made by the Senators are separated by political party, we tind iw statistically signiiicant differences between the abnormal retums of Democrats and Republicans. However, .seniority is a signiiicant factor. The common stock investinents of Senators with the least seniority {serving less than seven years) outperlomi the investments of the most senior Senators (serving more than 16 years) by a statistically significant margin.
II. Data and Research Design
Many of the Senate FDRs used in this study were obtained from the Web site www.opensecrets.org. However, the FDRs available at the site covered only current members of the Senate and only three yeais of data were provided at the time of data acquisition. Therefore, it was necessary to acquire additional FDRs from the Senate Printing Office.
In the FDRs, Senators identify all common stock purchases or sales, together with the date of the transactions and the approximate value of the transactions. We look only at assets not held in blind trusts since Senators do not report the holdings or transactions on any assets held in qualified blind tmsts. The data have some serious limitations. First, although each report is personally signed and authenticated by the Senator, none of the FDRs are audited for accuracy by any government agency or organization outside the government. Therefore, we cannot verify the accuracy or completeness of these reports. Second, the care used to fill out these reports vtiries widely. Some are typed, some are handwritten, some include monthly financial statements from their brokerage firms, and some use abbreviations and terms that are impossible to decipher. Thus, extraction of the data was frequently difficult and despite our best efforts may have resulted in occasional errors. Third, the available data do not permit us to measure the magnitude of profits earned by individual Senators. Senators report the dollar volume of transactions only within broad ranges ($1,001 to $15,000. $15,001 to S50.000. $50,001 to $IOO.()(X). $100,001 to $250,000. $250.(X)l to $500,000. $500,001 to $1.00{).0(K) and over $1,{MK).000). The broad ranges also present problems for trade-size-weighted analysis.
The database includes comnmn stock transactions made by the Senators, their spouses, and their dependent children. The transactions have been recorded with the name of the Senator, the transaction date, and the approximate value of the transaction. Assets were matched by name with CUSIP numbers from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases.
Without knowing any details about the information tlie Senators may possess, we cannot assume that abnonnal retums would necessarily be seen within days or even weeks of the stock purchase. Furthermore, the timing of abnormal performance is likely to vary across securities depending on the political and economic issues under discussion and the companies or industries affected. We therefore examine returns for a full calendai' yeiU" (255 trading days) after the acquisition or sale of the stcx'k. Abnormal performance is measured using the calendiU"-time portfolio approach with the Fama-French three-factor model and CAPM as recommended by Mitchell and Stafford (2000) .
Initially, we begin with 6,052 tjansactions. Before analysis we apply several .screens to the data. Only U.S. common stocks are included in the study. These screens eliminate, among other things, al! preferred stock. ADRs. REITs, foreign stocks, and mutual funds. We also eliminate all initial public offerings (IPOs) from the sample."^ In total, 360 observations are eliminated for the reasons given above. Among the surviving transactions, approximately 59% of the stocks are listed on the NYSE, 40% are traded on the NASDAQ, and about 1% are listed on the ASE.
After separating the transactions into purchases and sales, we begin by calculating the cumulative abnormal retum. CAR, ibr the buy sample and sell sample on eaeh event-day from day -255 to day +255. where r = 0 is the transaction day. First, daily average abnormal retum for the sample transactions is calculated as (I) A R = ^ »•,(/?"-/?""), ( = 1 where A' is the number of transactions in the sample (buy or sell), Rj, is the return from sample transaction / on trading day /. R,,,, is the return on the CRSP valueweighted market index Ibr trading day i, and U', is the trade weight of transaction (". As indicated previously. Senators report transaction amounts only within broad ranges. We therefore estimate the value of iheir trades using the iiiidpt)int of the range reported by the Senators for all transactions less than $250,000. For all transactions above $250,000, we assume a transaction size equal to $250.(XX). Next, we compute ihe cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) lor day / as:
where / ranges from day -255 to -H255. Although we do not rely on the CARs as a basis for our main statistical inferences, they do provide an indication as to -IPOs were excluded because i>f the possibility that .Senators were allocated ihese shares during ihc IPO pRK'ess. Loughran and Ritter (1995) have slmwti thai IPOs lypically cam a high retum on ilic (irsi trading day bul under-perfomi ihe niiirkot thereafier. Thus, ihoupli they may prove to \K p<n»r lotig-lcrm investinents. these losses are mure ttian likely compensulcd for by the large finii-day retums earned bv manv IPOs.
whether the Senators' portfolio outperformed the market. We compute CARs for both the buy and sell samples.
The calendar-time pi>rtfolio method for detecting long-run abnormal retums was first usedby Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) and is strongly recommended by Fama (1998). To briefly explain, for each calendar day a calend;u--time portfolio is constructed including all those stocks that have an event dale within the prior 255 days. The portfolio return is then calculated as (2) R,,., = where /?,,., is the portfolio retum on day t and c,,, is the compound value of transaction / from the event date to / -I. For an equal-weighted portfolio, the initial value of transaction / is set at $1. To calculate the trade-weighted portfolio, we replace the weight of $ I on the purchase date with the value of the trade. As before., we again estitiiate the value of their trades using the midpoint of the range reported by the Senators for all transactions less than $250,000. For all transactions above S250.000, we assume a transaction size equal to $250,(MK). We obtain daily portfolio retum series for four calendar-time portfolios: an equally-weighted portfolio of the buy transactions, a trade-size-weighted portfolio of the buy transactions, an equally-weighted portfolio of the sell transactions, and a trade-size-weighted portfolio of the sell transaction.^. The time span of these return series is from January 1. 1993 to December 31.1998.
To draw statistical inferences, we compound daily returns to yield monthly returns. We then calculate portfolio excess retums by subtracting the risk-free rate from the monthly return .series. We regress the portfolio excess retum series on two models: the CAPM and the Fama-French thiee-factor model. The CAPM is shown in equation (3), ,,-Rfj = ai + ^i{R,.j-Rf.,)+€,,,,, where R/,,, is the montlily calendar-time portfolio return at month (. R,,,j is the monthly return on the CRSP value-weighted index at month /. Rfj is the risk-free rate at month r. n,, and /^, are the regression parameters, and Spj is the error term. Tlie intercept, a. measures the average monthly abnormal return. The Fama-French three-factor model is shown in equation (4).
The regression parameters for the Fama-French model are a^. i3i, Sp, and h/,. The three factors /^,. Sp, and hp are zero-investment portfolios representing the excess return of the market (/?," -Rf), the difference between a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks (SMB), and the difference between a ptjrtlblio of high book-to-market stock.s and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks (HML), respectively. See Fama and French (1993) for details on the construction of the factors. The intercept, a, (Fama-French alpha), again measures the average monthly abnormal return, given ihe model. Data on the Fama-French three-factor model {R,,,,. SMB. and HML) are obtained from Ken French's Web site {http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/). Under our null hypothesis that the Senators* portfolios do nol exhibit significant ahnormal returns, the regression intercept (o,) is ncin-distinguishablc from zero tor both models. Rejecting this null hypothesis would indicate thai there is a non-zero abnormal retum associated with the Senators" portfolio. Table I shitws a breakdown of the common stock buy and sell transactions in the Senate sample. We divide the transactions by year showing the number of active traders each year, the mean number ol transactions per trader, and the median number of transactions per trader. Only a minority of Senators buy individual common stocks, never more than 389f' in any one year. The median number of buy transactions each year per trader is between Ihrcc and seven, suggesting Senators do not huy common stocks often. But the average number of buy transactions each year per trader is much higher, ranging between 11 and 29 purchases per trader each year. This indicates that there is a small group of Seniitnrs who are quite active in the stuck market. The vast majority of purchase transactions are less than $15,000 (71%) with 18% between $I5,()(K) and $50,000. 47r between $50,0(X) and $l(X).(}()0, and ihe remaining 1% arc larger than $KH),O(K). The sell transactions show a very similar paitern. The most active imders in descending order were Senators Chiibornc Pell vf Rhode Island, John Warner of Virginia, John Duni'orth of Missouri, and Barbara Boxer of Culifomia, who collectively accounted for nearly half of all ihe transactions in the sample. Table 1 shows ifie number of common stock buy and sell iransattions rnade by mambBrs ot tne U.S Senale during every year that was included in the dnal study sample Traders tor each year are the numbers ol individual Senators wh one or more of Ihe iransaclions included in the final sample Figure I presents graphs of the daily CARs for the samples of buy and sell transactions. For the 12 months prior to acquisition, common stocks purchased by Senators exhibit relatively small positive CARs (3.4%). Alter being acquired, the CARs increase to 28.6% during the next calendar year. The CARs for the sample of sell transactions are equally interesting. The CARs after sale by the Senators are nearly zero. However, prior to sale, we see another large run-up in the CARs during the 12 months before the event-day (25.1%). These results clearly support the notion that members of the Senate trade with a substantial informational advantage over ordinary investors. The results stiggest that Senators knew when to huy their common stocks and when to sell. Because of the vi'ell-docuinented statistical problems associaled with the u.se of event-time abnonnal returns, we do not IbriTially test the statistical significance of the CARs. To formally test the performance of stocks bought and sold, we rely on the calendar-time poitfolio returns.
III. Results

FIGURE 1
Daily Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Common Stocks Bought and Sold by U.S. Senators Figure 1 depicrs the cumulaiive abnormal returns (CARs) ot the buy and sell Iransaclions of U S Senators aunng ihe period 255 days p^br to and_a(ter (he event date (day 0 on ifie horiiontal axis). To calculaie tlie CAR, we use Ihe axarassion, CARi = 53r=_?65'^'^r. where AB is the abnormal daily relurr) on trading day (. Table 2 shows the results of the calendar-time portfolio analysis for hoth the buy and the sell samples. Both the equal-and trtide-v^eighted buy portfolios; produce positive mean market-adjusted retums. The mean annualized return for the equal-weighted Senate buy portfolio i.s 25.8% vs. 21.3"^ for the market portfolio. The mean annualized return for the trade-weighted Senate buy portfolio is 34.1 %, suggesting that the Senators invested more money in the stocks that ultimately performed best. Regressing the two buy portfolios on lhe niLirket risk premium alone (CAPM), the Jensen alpha is positive although not statistically signilicant in either case. However, when we regress the huy portrnlios on the F'ama-French three-factor model, the l-ama-French alphas are bt)th positive and statistically sijznilicant in each case, indicating a substantial infomialional advantage. The Fama-French alpha was much higher lor the trade-weighted buy portlolio supporting our earlier contention that Senators tend to invest more funds in the better i>erforniing stocks. In looking al the other coefficients generated by the Fama-French regressions, we find that the beta coefficients for both buy portfolios are relatively close to one. suggesting that the Senators tilted toward stocks with average market risk. Coefficients assticiated with the size factor, SMB. are positive and statistically different from zero, suggesting that Senators favored smaller companies. Coefficients associated with the value/growth factor, HML. are negative and significantly different from zero indicating thai Senators also favored growth stocks with low book-tomarket value ratios.
The market-adjusted returns are negative for both the equal-and tradeweighted sell portfolios. Although the Jensen alphas and Fama-French alphas are negative for these portfolios, neither is significantly different from /_ero. As with the buy portfolios, the results suggest that Senators tended to sell stocks of smaller companies witJi average market risk and higher book-to-market value ratios.
To combine the effects of the buy transactions with the sell transactions, we analyze a hedged portfolio in which we hold the purchase transactions long and short the sell transactions. The results of this analysis are also presented in Ta-ble 2. The Jensen alphas are positive and statistically significant for both the equal-and Irade-weighted ponfolios. The F;ima-French alphas are positive for both the equal-and trade-weighted portfolios but statistically significant only in the case of the trade-weighted portfolio. These results indicate substantial informational advantage. Again lhe trade-weigh ted alphas are much higher suggesting that Senators invested much more heavily in the most profitable transactions. As we would expect for a hedged portfolio, the beta coefficient is not significantly different from zero indicating little market risk. Coefficients associated with the size factor. SMB. are not significantly different from zero indicating that the Senators" buy transactions and sell transactions involve similarly sized firms. The coefficient associated with the value/growth factor. HML. is positive and .statistically significant on an equal-weighted basis suggesting Senators' buys involve more growth firms than their sells. The negative and statistically significant HML coefficient in the trade-weighted regression indicates tbat on a value-weigbted basis. Senators invest tnore money in value stocks than they sell.
Taken collectively, the results of these analyses are economically very significant. Barber and Odean {2{){X)) measured common stix;k returns for 66.465 randomly selected households in Ihc U.S. from 1991 to 1996 and found tbat the average household underperttirmed the market by approximately 12 basis points per month. Jeng. Mctrick, and Zeckhauser (2001) examined the returns to corporate insiders when they traded shares of their respective company's common stock during the period 1975 to 1996 and found that insiders earned an economically significant positive abnormal return of 50 basis points per month. In comparison, we find thai members of lhe U.S. Senate outperformed the miu^ket by almost 100 basis points per month. Although some of the abnormal returns measured for the Senate portfolios are not slatistically significant, we iire somewhat hampered by the short time-series ol monthly returns, which invariably lowers tbe power of our statistical tests.' Nonetheless, the economic returns earned by the Senators are extraordinarily large.
Because a few Senators purchased a disproportionately large number of stocks, it is necessary to address concerns that a few high volume traders might seriously bias our results. To do this, we calculate a calendar-time portfolio for each Senator and then we average lhe returns across Senators on each calendar day. Analyzing the data in this fashion gives each Senator's calendar-lime portfolio equal weight in the analysis. Assuming only a few bigh volume traders were responsible for ibe abnormal returns found in the full sample, the abnormal returns should disappear witb this analysis. On tbe other hand, the persistence of positive statistically significant abnormal returns would suggest that trading with an informational advantage is reasonably widespread among Senators wbo trade. Table 3 presents tbe results of this analysis. When we equally weighl tbe returns of each Senator, the buy portfolio earns a compound annual rate of 28.6% on an equal-weighted basis and 31.1% on a trade-weighted basis compared to 21.3% for the market. Both Jensen alphas for the buy portfolio are positive, but only the irade-weighted Jensen alpha is statistically significant. The Fama-French alphas for the buy portfolio are positive and statistically significant on both an l Disclosure Forms of the Senators are only retained six years by law. Afier six years, they are destroyed.
equal-and trade-weighted basis. On the sell side, we see no evidence of abnonnal returns witb Jensen alphas being slightly negative and Fama-French alphas being slightly positive, none of which are statistically significant. Comparing Table 2 (whole sample) to Table 3 (weighing the Senators equally) we lind that the resnlts obtained from the buy portfoiios are very similar. The sell portfolios also behave .similarly in that neither case produces evidence of statistically significant returns. We therefore conclude that our results are not biased by the heavy trading volume of some Senators and that trading with an informational advantage is common among Senators.
Positions of power within the Senate (committee memberships and chairmanships) are generally determined on the basis of political paily and seniority. To explore the impact of party afliliation and seniority on stock pertbrmance. Senate stock transactions are grtmped by party (Table 4 ) and then by seniority (Table 5) .
We find that our analyses of the calendar-time portfolios of Democratic Senators produced similar results to our analyses of tbe total sample. Both the equaland trade-weighted buy portfolios of Democratic Senators produce signilicant market-adjusted mean returns with the trade-weighted market-adjusted returns being approximately twice as large as the equal-weighted adjusted returns, again .suggesting larger investments in the best perfomiing stocks. The equal-and tradeweighted Democratic buy portfolios produced higher annuali/.ed returns than the Senate sample as a whole, with returns of 28.6% aiid 36.1%. respectively. In each case, the Jensen alphas are positive but not statistically signilicani. Both Fama- Dependsnl variables are eveni portlolio returns. Rp, m excess ol lhe one-monlh Treasury bill rare, ff/, obaervsri at Ihe beginning o) the month Each monlh, * B torm equal-and trade-weighted portfolios ol all sample lirms Ihat have compleied the even within the previous year The event portfolio is rebalanced monthly to drop all companies tial reach the end of their one-year period and add all companies that have |usi e;<eculea a transaction. For the CAPM regression, we use Rpf. to eslimate the regression parameiers a , and iJ, in Ihe expression Hp; -R,, T= a_ ^ 0,(Rmi -Rtii * t,, The iniercept. a. measures the average monthly abnormal return, given the model. For the Fama and French ihree-faciof model, we use Rp). to estimate the regression parameters a,, i.1,. Sp. and hp in lhe expression Rp^ -R/^, = a, * rf,(R,,,., -''/,() + SpSMBf + ^iiHML/ + Ep^,. The three (actors are zero-in vest me nl portfolios representing the excess return oi the marfcei. Rm -Rf. lhe difference between a portfolio ol small stocks and big stocks, SMB; and the difiefence between a portfolio of htgh book-to-markei stocks and low book-to market stocks, HML See Fama and French (1993) for details on the constructEon ot the tactors. The intercept, a. again measures the average monthly aDnormai return, given the moael "*•, "•, " . and * indicate significance at the 0 5%. 2.5%. 5.0%, and 10% levels, respeclively.
French alphas are positive and statistically significant. Consistent with the full sample. Democratic Senators leaned toward smaller growth firms with average market risk.
Stocks purchased by Republican Senators did not perform as well as those purchased by Democrats. Stocks purchased by Republicans have smaller positive market-adjusted returns with average annualized returns of T1.'A% for the equal-weighted ealendar-time portfolio and 23.09^ for the trade-weighted portfolio. Furthermore, neither the Jensen alphas nor the Fama-French alphas are statistically different than zero. However, when analyzed for statistical differences between the buy portfolios of the two parties u.sing a /-test, the returns from the buy portfolios of Democrats and Repubiicans are not statistically different.
Analyses of the Democratic sell portfolios indicate no abnormal returns after sale. The equal-weighted Democratic sell portfolio yields a raw mean average annual return of 24.5% with a small positive market-adjusted mean return. The trade*-weighted Democratic sell portfolio yields a mean average annual return of 23.5%. For hoth Democratic sell portfolios, the regression analyses calculate a negative Jensen alpha and a positive Fama-French alpha with none of the alphas hcing signilicantly different from zero.
Common stocks sold by Republican Senators underperformed the market during the calendar year after sale. The mean annual return is 11.5''/t ior ihe equalweighted Republican sell portfolio and Ib.l'/r for the trade-weighted Republican sell portfolio. The lower return for the trade-weighted portfolio suggests that Repuhlican Senators sold off a higher volume of tho.se stocks that would do worst The tnree factors are zero-^nveEiment portfolios representing the excess relurn of Ihe markel, Rm -Rt: lhe difference between a portfolio ot small stocks and big slocks. SMB, and Ihe difference Between a parttolKj of higti book-to-markei slocks and low book-to market slocks, HML See Fama and French (1993) for delads on me construction of lhe factors Theintercepi, <>. again measures the average monthly aonoimal raturn. given Ihe model " " , •", '•, and • indicate signilicance ai the 0.5%. 2.5%, 5.0% and 10% levels, respectively.
in lhe coming year. The Jensen alphas and Fama-French alphas are negative for both Republican sell portfolios although neither is statistically significant. The regression coeflicients suggest that the stock.s Republicans sold were firms with average market risk, average size, and average book-to-market value. As with the party buy portfolios, when comparing the mean returns lor the respective party sell portfolios in a /-test, we find no statistically significant differences between the two political parties.
To e.\amine the influence of seniority, we fonn three groups with approximately the same number of Senators in each group: those with less than seven years in the Senate, those with seven to 16 years in the Senate, and those with more than 16 years. Stocks purchased by all three groups yield positive marketadjusted mean returns. Stocks purchased by Senators with the least seniority earned an annualized mean return of 25.5% on an equal-weighted basis and 35.8% on a trade-weighted basis in comparison to those purchased by Senators with middle seniority that earned 27.6'/r (EW) and 24.l9f-(TW) and those purchased by Senators with the longest seniority with 27.2% (EW) and 30,0% (TW). The CAPM regression analysis of the buy portfolios produces positive equal-and trade-weigh ted Jensen alphas for all three groups although only the Jensen alpha of the equal-weighted buy portfolio of the group with most .seniority is statistically significant. Using the three-factor model, all the buy portfoiios al.so yield positive Fama-French alphas. The Fama-French alpha is only statistically signiticant for the trade-weighted buy portfolio of Senators with the least seniority. Comparison of the mean returns from the buy portfolios of the three seniority groups with a r-test shows no statistical differences between the groups.
Regression analyses of the sell portfolios for Senators with the least seniority and Senators with middle seniority produce all negative Jensen and Fama-French alphas, although only the sell portfolios of Senators with the least seniority produce statistically signiticant alphas. The equal-weighted sell portfolio of Senators with the least seniority yields a statistically signiticant negative Jen.sen alpha and their trade-weighted sell portfolio yields a signiticant negative Fama-French alpha. Analyses of the sell portfolios of Senators with the most seniority produce positive market-adjusted mean returns and positive alphas, none of which are statistically signilicant. Again, a r-test reveals no signiticant differences among the mean returns of the sell portfolios for the three groups.
Combining the buy transactions with the sell transactions in hedged portfolios, we find that the hedged portfolios of Senators with the least seniority substantially outpertorm the other two seniority groups. For Senators with the least seniority, the Jen.sen alphas and Fama-French alphas are positive and statistically signilicant when transactions are both equal-and trade-weighted. The Jensen alphas and Fama-French alphas are also all positive for the middle seniority group, but only the Jensen alpha for the equal-weighted portfolio is statistically significant. The hedged portfolios of Senators with the most seniority exhibit small positive Jen.sen and Fama-French alphas., none of which are signiticant. We also find that the mean return of the hedged trade-weighted portfolio of Senators with the least seniority is statistically higher than the mean return of the hedged tradeweighted portfolio of Senators with the most seniority.
As a final analysis, we divide the sample by years and measure cumulative abnormal returns on an annual basis. We Hnd that, during the years 1993 through 1996. the pattern of cumulative abnormal returns lor btith the buy and the sell samples looks remarkably similar to the sample as a whole. In these four years, the buy samples all show moderate to low positive CARs prior to purchase followed by a strong positive surge after the event date. In 1993 In . 1994 In . 1995 In . and 1996 . the daily CARs for the buy samples rise 39.6%. 21.6'7r, 43.6%, and 42.4%. respectively, during the 12 calendar months after acquisition on a trade-weighted basis. Sale samples from this same time period also behave consistently with the combined sell sample. For 1993 though 1996, we lind a consistent pattern of very strong positive daily CARs in the year preceding the sale that peak ju.st prior to sale. There were no abnormal returns after stocks were sold during these four years.
However in 1997 and 1998. we see very different results. In both of these years, we find little evidence of abnormai returns for either the buy samples or the sell samples, suggesting that something dranuitic occurred between 1996 and 1997 that curtailed the Senators' normal trading habits. We also observe that trading activity slowed considerably during these two years with Senatorial stock purchases falling 36% from 1996 to 1997 and sales falling 33% during the same period. Tlie retirement of and failure to re-elect some Senators who were high volume traders (e.g.. Senator Pell retired at the end of 1996) could have caused the sudden drop in trading activity in 1997. The sudden change in trading habits is more difficult to explain since we find no changes in the law that would likely cause such a reaction. Besides changes in the law, other explanations seem plausible. For example. Boiler's (1995) work received considerable publicity in the print media and on television. Boiler may have created some concern among Senators that researchers were actively investigating their trading activities.
IV. Conclusions
Members of the U.S. Senate have obvious access to valuable information by virtue of their government position and social contacts. Our goal in this researcb is to determine if the Senators* investments tend to outperform the overall market, which would support the notion that Senators use their informational advantage for personal gain as suggested by public choice theory. We test whether common stocks purchased and sold by U.S. Senators e.Nhibit abnormal returns.
Cumulative abnormal returns for the portfolio of stocks bought by Senators are near zero for the calendar year prior to the date of purchase. After acquisition, the cumulative abnonnal return rises over 25% within one calendar year after the purchase date. The cumulative abnormal returns for the portfolio of stocks sold by the Senators are near zero for the calendar year after the date of sale. However, these same stocks saw a cumulative abnormal positive return of 25% during the year immediately preceding the event date. These results suggest that Senators knew appropriate times to both buy and sell their common stocks.
Regressing the calendar-time portfolio returns of the entire sample on the Fama-French three-factor model, we find that sttK'ks purchased by U.S. Senators earn statistically signiticant positive abnormal returns outperforming the market by 85 basis points per month on a trade-weigh ted basis as a further indication that Senators use their informational advantage. That Senators use an informational advantage is additionally evidenced by the fact that the trade-weighted portfol io of purchased stocks outperforms the equal-weighted portfoiio suggesting that Senators made much heavier investments in those stocks that ultimately performed best. After being sold by Senators, stocks underperform the market by 12 basis points per month on a trade-weighted basis although the abnormal returns after sale are not statistically significant. Combining the buy transactions with the sell transactions in a hedged portfolio we Hnd that Senators outperform the market by 97 basis points (nearly 1%) per month on a trade-weighted basis. Abnomial returns from the hedged portfolio are statistically significant when we use either the CAPM or the Fama-French three-factor model. Regression coefficients of the Fama-French three-factor model suggest that Senators favor the common sttKks of smaller growth firms with average market risk.
We find no reliable differences between the returns earned by Democrats and Republicans but .seniority appears to be important. Senators with the least seniority (in their first Senatorial term) earn statistically higher returns than those Senators with the longest seniority (over 16 years in the Senate).
When we examine the trades on an annual basis, the return patterns of common stocks bought and sold by Senators for years 1993 through 1996 appear very similar to the patterns observed for the entire sample. However, in 1997 and 1998, we lind signiticantiy reduced trading volume and no evidence of abnormal returns.
It should be noted that these results should not be used to infer illegal activity. CurTent law does not prohibit Senators from trading stock on the basis of information acquired in the course of performing their normal Senatorial functions. Nor can we speculate on the magnitude of profits earned on these transactions because of limitations in the data. However, it seems clear that Senators have demonstrated a definite informational advantage over other investors although the specific source(s) and nature of that information remain unknown.
Until now, the primai7 focus of ethical concern with respect to legislative activity has been on campaign finance reform. Some Senators, most notably John McCain of Arizona, have expressed a strong belief that the methods currently used to fund political campaigns inherently cause agency problecns. However, our results suggest that the problems may extend beyond campaign financing. Political power confers many benefits. Among those benefits are privileged access to information, the power to inlluence legislation, and the power to inlluence the application of regulator)'jurisdiction by administrative agencies. It makes sense that politicians would use such powers for personal gain and also that they compete for any rents that arise from such inlluence. Our results are consistent with lhe hypothesis that such rents exist.
The results i>f this study wan ant further investigation. Senate committees can be studied for abnormal returns and examined to determine if Senators serving on committees disproportionately invest in companies under their committee's Jurisdiction. Membership on certain key committees may provide Senators with better investment opportunities than otber committees. Connections between campaign contributions and common stock transactions also seem like fertile ground ft)r further study. We recommend that the tinancial transactions of members of the U.S. House of Representatives, high-ranking officials of the Federal executive branch, and Federal judges should all be examined and tested in future research.
